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Counterterrorism Security at Museums in the United Kingdom 
 
Atkinson, C., Yates, D. and Brooke, N.  
 
Abstract 
This article reflects on the value and limitations of the use of Freedom of Information (FOI) in 
the collection of data on counterterrorism policies and practices at museums in the United 
Kingdom (UK). In doing so, this article re-interprets the museum within the “single narrative” 
of global jihadist terrorism before using FOI to uncover counterterrorism security measures 
at museums in the UK. We particularly signpost the importance of the role of the museum 
security manager as the interface between the museum and the wider UK counterterrorism 
network. Throughout, but particularly in the discussion section, the article reflects on the 
value and limitations of FOI as a social research tool. The conclusion highlights the 
requirement for further qualitative enquiry into the museum as an emerging site of 
counterterrorism security discourse and practice, particularly in relation to how museum 
security managers understand and navigate this unique cultural space. 
 
Introduction 
Recent events in Paris and London have demonstrated how the museum represents a target 
for terrorist activity. On 3 February 2017 in Paris, at around 10am local time, an Egyptian man, 
Abdullah Reda al-Hamamy, was shot five times outside the Louvre. Al-Hamamy had used a 
machete to attack a security patrol protecting the museum. More recently, in mid-2017, 
details emerged from a court case in London that indicated how a network of Islamic State–
linked fighters, one of whom was killed in Syria, had sought to acquire firearms and explosives 
in furtherance of a plan to conduct a terrorist attack at the British Museum in London. In mid-
2018 a London-based teenager, Safaa Boular, became Britain’s youngest convicted female 
Islamic State terrorist, after the court heard how Boular had planned this attack at the British 
Museum when she was seventeen. Such evidence supports the case that museums, in 
Western Europe at least, can be considered as coming within the operational purview and 
targeting calculus of jihadist terrorists. That museums have recently featured as terrorist 
targets in Paris and London would be unsurprising to the keenest of observers: museums have 
been a site of a terrorist violence from a diverse range of groups, on multiple occasions and 
in a variety of jurisdictions in the past decade, including in the United States in 2009,1 Belgium 
in 2014,2 and Tunisia in 2015.3 The security impact of such terrorist attacks can spread 
beyond the targeted country. For example, media reports following the 2017 Louvre incident 
indicated that the National Gallery and the British Museum in London, and other museums 
including those in Manchester and Liverpool, had implemented enhanced counterterrorism 
security measures following consultation with, among other agencies, the police. These 
measures included prohibiting members of the public from entering museums with large 
items of luggage and the checking of all bags upon entry due to concerns that such items may 




In response to such developments this article uses Freedom of Information (FOI) 
requests to uncover the recent development of counterterrorism security practices at 
museums in the United Kingdom (UK); a subject on which there is a paucity of previous 
literature or research.5 Particular research interest is afforded to how police and security 
agencies communicate terrorist threats to museums and how these are received by those 
responsible for recommending and implementing counterterrorism security measures in the 
museum environment. In doing so, this article develops two key lines of inquiry. First, from 
an analytical perspective, the contemporary museum is re-interpreted within the context of 
a “single narrative” of global jihadist terrorism, an outlook that justifies and legitimizes the 
targeting of sociocultural sites from both instrumental and symbolic perspectives. Attention 
is given to the ways in which museums in the UK—many of which exemplify the recent shift 
from the “old” to the “new” museum—fulfill the criteria for terrorist target selection and have 
featured in both jihadist propaganda and operational activity. Second, using data collected 
from FOI requests, the article uncovers the nature of current counterterrorism security 
practices at museums. This section particularly signposts the important role of the museum 
security manager as the interface between the museum and the UK counterterrorism policing 
and security network. Throughout, but particularly in the discussion section, the article 
reflects on the value and limitations of FOI as a social research tool. The conclusion highlights 
the requirement for further qualitative inquiry into the museum as an emerging site of 
counterterrorism security discourse and practice, particularly in relation to how museum 
security managers understand and navigate this unique cultural space. 
 
Re-interpreting the museum as a terrorist target 
The museum, as a sociocultural institution, symbolizes and communicates the particular 
values of the political community within which it is located. If Western European nation-states 
can be appropriately considered as “imagined communities”6 then the museum has 
historically played a central role in this process of imagination.7 Nick Prior has documented 
how museums were central to state formation in nineteenth-century Europe8; an approach 
that renders the targeting of the Louvre intelligible. Such an interpretation of the museum is 
not one that can be confined to the annals of history, nor solely to state-building in France. 
The contemporary museum has remained, in a modernist sense, an expression of state 
power, wealth, success, and status, particularly through the global expansion beyond its 
European roots in a rapidly reconfiguring international political landscape.9 However, the 
museum has not remained a static idea. In recent times the museum has been re-oriented, 
as a reaction to the previously unidirectional relationship between the museum as an 
“imperial power” implicated in exploiting “colonised regions and communities.”10 The “new 
museum” remains a political agent in the reconstruction and promotion of cross-cultural 
dialog, demonstrating the firm linkage with its nineteenth-century lineage.11 For Pietrse the 
museum, in this new context of multiculturalism in an age of globalization where art and 
culture cannot be divorced from international politics, exhibits power with cultural and 
political agency.12 Just as terrorist groups and networks build their own binary narrative to 
support and legitimize their operations, and despite recent shifts toward a more progressive 
posture, the museum remains a “boundary-drawing device” or an “apparatus of difference” 
that has sought to build national and cultural identity. The museum is an expression or 
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imagination of the nature of political community, and not simply an apolitical repository for 
the exhibition of cultural artifacts and objects.13 It is important, therefore, to consider the 
contemporary museum in the context of terrorist targeting. 
 
While the museum has not featured as a particular concern in terrorism scholarship, the topic 
of terrorist target selection has been subject to some academic attention. In a 1993 article on 
tactics and trends in terrorist targeting, Bruce Hoffman noted that, while the lethality of 
terrorist operations had increased from the 1970s to the 1980s, the operational conservatism 
of terrorist groups was reflected in, among other factors, the continuity of terrorist target 
selection.14 More recently, reflecting changes in the post–11 September 2001 terrorism 
landscape, Ranya Ahmed remarked that while target selection has been “relatively 
understudied” in terrorism scholarship, it forms a “key operational decision” for terrorist 
groups, the understanding of which can be critical to the effectiveness of counterterrorism 
strategies.15 The challenges in doing so, however, are compounded by the “profoundly 
complex and dynamic” nature of such processes.16 Despite such difficulties, a common 
thread in recent terrorist target selection has been the focus on crowded places, which 
provide the opportunity for terrorists to inflict casualties (where desirable) and attract 
significant media and political attention.17 
 
Decades before the emergence of the now preponderant threat from jihadist terrorism, Brian 
Jenkins famously posited that terrorists want a lot of people watching and listening, not a lot 
of people dead.18 Terrorist violence today is less restrained than when Jenkins’s maxim was 
first proposed: inflicting casualties is frequently a fundamental objective of groups such as 
Islamic State and Al Qaeda, and those who act in their name. Nevertheless, achieving 
maximum media exposure remains an important goal of terrorists of all hues. Terrorism thus 
continues to be fundamentally a form of communication19; a provocative expression of 
political intent that, importantly, seeks to transcend the principal act of violence itself. 
Terrorist attacks still seek to resonate with a wider audience beyond those immediately 
targeted, engender fear in a broader population, and, in some cases, provoke a response from 
the victimized community.20 Within this calculus of communication target sites have 
maintained a particular symbolism in the values, ideologies, and beliefs that they are 
understood to represent.21 As Anthony Richards noted, 
 
Indeed, terrorism is often perceived as an expressive violence because the message is 
intended to outweigh the intended impact. … This “expressive” and “demonstration” effect 
may be evident in the symbolic nature of terrorist targeting, exemplified in the choice of the 
iconic targets of US economic and military power of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
respectively, as indeed in the targeting of the British cabinet by the IRA [Irish Republican 
Army] through the Brighton bomb of 1984. It is the symbolic nature of many terrorist targets 
that underpins further the psychological impact and the “message” of terrorism.22 
 
Museums clearly fulfill such instrumental and symbolic targeting criteria. In fact, in his 2019 
study of counterterrorism and the protection of vulnerable sites in open societies, Peter Lehr 
highlighted museums as one of the “plenty” targets in cities that are “critical, vulnerable and 
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under threat.”23 Yet much of the attention to date afforded to the interest of jihadist 
terrorists in relation to museums and cultural objects has focused on the iconoclastic 
annihilation of artifacts by such terrorist groups in their territorial strongholds: from the 
bombing of the Bamiyan Buddhas by the Taliban in Afghanistan in 200124 to the destruction 
of artifacts in Mosul museum in Iraq, and beyond, in 2015.25 The targeting of such cultural 
artifacts and objects is not necessarily a new phenomenon.26 Nevertheless, the symbolic and 
communicative aspects of such attacks have become increasingly apparent in the networked 
age of mass and social media; for example, through the communication, justification, and 
celebration of such attacks in Islamic State’s online propaganda.27 Yet, despite an acute 
concern among security agencies with the problem of “returning foreign fighters” who bring 
home experiences and skills learned in the operational field in conducting “jihad,”28 
significantly less attention has been given to the targeting of museums and cultural objects in 
the “far enemy” of the West. 
 
Despite this general passivity to considering the museum as a terrorist target, any such attack 
would be unsurprising to those familiar with the fundamental principles of terrorist targeting 
and recent jihadist propaganda and operational activity. In early 2014, for example, Al Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula explicitly highlighted the legitimacy of attacking the Louvre through 
its online propaganda magazine and operations manual Inspire. A tantalizing glimpse of the 
strategic interest of Islamic State in the targeting of museums, specifically in the UK, also 
emerged in early 2016. In a video titled “kill wherever you find them” the Islamic State 
celebrated the Paris attacks of November 2015 and vowed to undertake further, similar 
attacks in Europe. The UK featured at the very end of this slick propaganda montage, and 
among the various British sites highlighted—including, in rapid succession, the Palace of 
Westminster, Buckingham Palace, Covent Garden, and Trafalgar Square—the National Gallery 
was the very last to appear. This image can be seen in figure 1 on next page. 
 
There is also evidence, as noted in the introduction, that the targeting of museums in the UK 
has featured in the recent operational activity of jihadist terrorists. Such evidence supports 
the case that museums in the UK can certainly be considered as coming within the operational 
purview and targeting calculus of jihadist terrorists. 
 
Figure 1. Image of the National Gallery as featured in Islamic State video “kill them wherever 






The interest of groups such as Islamic State and branches of Al Qaeda toward museums not 
only resonates with the key principles of terrorist targeting, incorporating both instrumental 
and symbolic objectives, but also fits squarely into the overall jihadist narrative that justifies 
the undertaking of mass-casualty, high-impact attacks at such locations. For some time, 
Western intelligence agencies have located the threat from global jihadist terrorism within 
the broader context of a “single narrative” that underpins the strategic outlook of such groups 
and their followers and that seeks to justify acts of extreme political violence.29 This single 
narrative, initially formulated in the context of a preponderant threat from Al Qaeda, also 
forms a backdrop to the messaging and violence of Islamic State.30 While the single narrative 
has oftentimes been considered for the important role it plays in radicalization processes, it 
also impinges on and influences the overall context of terrorist targeting; and in particular the 
legitimization of particular targets. In propagating a conspiratorial war against Islam waged 
by the kafir, groups that adhere to and propagate this single narrative create the conditions 
within which a wide range of people, groups, activities, and locations can be justifiably 
targeted for violence: from Parisian café-dwellers, satirical journalists, and concert-goers in 
the city of prostitution and obscenity; to shoppers, commuters, tourists, soldiers, and police 
officers in other European cities of the Crusader nations. Through this single narrative the 
Islamic State and similar terrorist groups propagate and promote a binary “clash of 
civilizations” between Islam and the West31; legitimizing attacks on soft targets and crowded 
places with symbolic significance. Illustrating the power of the single narrative of global 
jihadism to effectively frame an array of contemporary and historic events and practices, both 
the old (imperial) museum and the new (multiculturalism) museum may be considered as 
legitimate targets due to the political symbolism of both ideas: the former as representative 
of colonial power and exploitation; the latter as an expression of contemporary ideologies 
and values of democracy that are antithetical to extremist views. It is in this context that the 




The Use of FOI Requests to Research Counterterrorism Security at Museums 
Beyond the preceding re-interpretation of the museum as a terrorist target this article is 
principally informed by data obtained through the submission of FOI requests to 40 museums 
and 48 police forces in the UK. FOI legislation in the UK—manifest in the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 and the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002—stipulates that 
public authorities are obliged to publish certain information about their activities and that 
members of the public are entitled to request information from public authorities. FOI 
legislation in the UK covers over 100,000 public authorities, agencies, and services, regardless 
of size or nature, including museums.32 Exemptions to disclosure include information relating 
to national security, where there is also no requirement to confirm or deny that any such 
information exists. Despite such exemptions, the recent implementation of FOI in the UK 
reflects a broader international trend in ensuring openness, transparency, and accountability 
in relation to information held by various levels of government and agencies in the wider 
public sector. Even as the UK was proposing FOI legislation a range of countries had already 
passed similar law: from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to France, Hungary, and 
Ireland.33 
 
The intention of the requests made for this study was to establish a baseline of the extent to 
which museums have been subject to, and participated in, counterterrorism security 
measures and practices. The forty-eight police forces selected cover all such organizations in 
the UK. The forty museums were selected on the basis of the most popular museums by public 
footfall in 2017. This list, obtained from the Association of Leading Visitor Attractions, 
provided an appropriate array of museums and art galleries from across the UK, with at least 
one museum or gallery in each of the four nations (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland).34 The use of FOI legislation to obtain data for the purposes of social research—to 
identify and examine the policies, processes, and practices of governments and public 
bodies—has become increasingly common across a range of academic disciplines, including 
sociology, criminology, and other social sciences, although it still remains underutilized.35 In 
the discipline of criminology the potential of FOI requests to furnish researchers with data 
that would be otherwise unobtainable or difficult to access has been recognized for at least a 
decade. In 2009 Kevin J. Brown, writing from a criminal justice perspective, noted the “lack of 
awareness” and reluctance to use FOI as a research tool among his peers and colleagues, 
despite the straightforwardness of its use and the potential to obtain information from 
agencies that are “data rich but reluctant to publicise.”36 Yet even by 2014 the full potential 
of this method of research had yet to be realized across the social sciences. As Ashley Savage 
and Richard Hyde noted, 
 
FOIA [The Freedom of Information Act] is a powerful tool available to researchers. It should 
be used more readily by social researchers investigating public bodies and/or matters of 
concern to such bodies, as the large amounts of data held by the State can usefully be 
employed to develop the analysis of many different research questions.37 
 
While FOI legislation has recently been used by researchers in terrorism38 and policing39 to 
gain access to data that would otherwise have been unobtainable and inaccessible to them, 
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the use of this research tool in museum and heritage studies has been limited, if it has been 
used at all. Even beyond such disciplinary deliberations, the use of FOI as a data-gathering 
tool remains underutilized in social research more generally, despite its propensity to provide 
insightful data for subsequent analysis. 
 
The Results of FOI Requests to Research Counterterrorism Security at Museums 
Responses to our requests for information varied, with some institutions more willing to 
supply information than others. Overall, thirty-eight responses were received from museums 
and forty-eight from police forces. Responses ranged from the refusal to supply any 
information on the grounds of national security (including almost every police force and some 
museums) to the comprehensive provision of policy document and information detailing 
security structures, training, protocols, and communications pertaining to counterterrorism 
measures in particular museums. This variation in responses may seem initially surprising 
given that all museums and police forces are subject to the same legislative requirements in 
regards to FOI. Ben Worthy, however, writing in relation to the impact of FOI on local and 
central government, has noted how some agencies and institutions are more open than 
others, with such variable openness dependent on factors such as context, culture, and 
political leadership.40 This article will deal firstly with the FOI responses obtained from the 




FOI Responses: The Police Service 
The FOI requests submitted to forty-eight individual police forces yielded minimal 
information. An initial request for comprehensive information was sent to one police force as 
a pilot exercise. The information requested at this stage centered on the work of the police 
Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA). The CTSA, as a specialist role in UK policing, was 
developed and implemented in the period following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001.41 CTSAs are based locally in police forces and counterterrorism hubs across the UK, 
with the primary responsibility to provide protective security advice to private businesses and 
public sector organizations to prevent, and mitigate the effects of, terrorist acts. The CTSA is 
responsible for both location-specific site appraisal and the raising of public awareness of 
terrorism through initiatives such as Project Argus and Project Griffin, which aim to enhance 
resilience.42 CTSA work is therefore firmly aligned to the Protect pillar of CONTEST, the UK’s 
counterterrorism strategy.43 The CTSA role was initially undertaken by sworn police officers, 
although the current CTSA cadre comprises a mix of both police officers and civilian staff. In 
the delivery of their duties CTSAs must be fully aware of the contours of the current and 
emerging threat landscape. This is achieved through, first, close collaboration with police 
colleagues working in areas of policing aligned with other pillars of CONTEST, particularly 
Pursue. Second, CTSAs also receive threat assessments and strategic intelligence products 
from intelligence agencies and then “push out” the threat picture to the businesses and the 
public. Although this work is delivered locally by CTSAs it is also coordinated through the 
National Counter Terrorism Security Office, with focus on three key workstreams: crowded 
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places; critical national infrastructure; and hazardous sites and substances. The museum 
sector falls within the first of these workstreams.44 
 
The initial pilot request for information from police forces particularly focused on obtaining 
existing and detailed data on the extent to which CTSAs delivered counterterrorism security 
advice to museums and, as a comparator, to other visitor attractions, infrastructure, and 
public institutions; as well as a description of any advice given. The response of the particular 
police force subject to this initial request, however, was very limited in the provision of any 
meaningful information. Much of the requested information was withheld with reference to 
FOI exemptions relating to terrorism and law enforcement, with specific concerns cited that 
to confirm or deny the existence of the requested information would undermine the force’s 
policing capabilities and compromise law enforcement tactics.45 Given the unwillingness to 
provide information in response to this pilot request for comprehensive information, a 
revised, and much more parsimonious, FOI request was subsequently submitted to all UK 
police forces. This request simply asked: 
 
Since 1 April 2013 have any police officers and/or members of police staff employed by your 
force, during the course of their duties/roles/responsibilities, delivered counter-terrorism 
security advice to any museum or art gallery? 
 
However, even in responding to this significantly less detailed request almost every police 
force refused to provide an answer. In doing so, these police forces neither confirmed or 
denied that they hold the requested information, again basing their refusal on exceptions in 
the FOI legislation relating to both national security and law enforcement.46 Only one police 
force, the Ministry of Defense Police, responded fully to the question, stating 
straightforwardly: “The Ministry of Defence Police have delivered counter terrorism advice to 
a museum.”47 
 
The paucity of data gathered from the submission of FOI requests to every police force in the 
UK—a not inconsiderable research effort—may suggest, on an initial assessment, that this 
overall approach is unlikely to provide any significant data on the subject of counterterrorism 
security in the museum space. Yet, in contrast to the lack of information provided by police 
forces, the responses received from the forty museums and galleries to which FOI requests 
were sent yielded some very detailed information on counterterrorism security practices at 
these locations in the UK. 
 
FOI Responses: Museums 
Unlike the forty-eight police forces, all of whom responded to the FOI requests in some shape 
or form, only thirty-eight of the forty museums contacted provided a response. However, 
within these thirty-eight responses there was some significant detail provided from twenty-
seven museums; fifteen of which responded fully to the requests, with twelve providing 
partial disclosure/partial refusal (with such refusal based on legislative exemptions). The 




Of the eleven museums that refused to disclose any information, nine replied with a full 
refusal based on FOI legislative exemptions, with two museums responding that they were 
not covered by FOI legislation and therefore under no obligation to provide any information. 
The British Museum in London provided a typical response where there was a refusal to 
disclose information based on legislative exemptions: 
 
Figure 2. Museum FOI response outcomes. 
 
 
I can confirm that the Museum holds some of this information. This is information exempt 
from disclosure under Section 31(1)(a) and (g) of the Freedom of Information Act where 
disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the prevention or detection of crime and 
the exercise of the Museum’s functions for purposes (i) and (j) of subsection (2) (securing the 
health, safety and welfare of persons at work, and protecting persons other than persons at 
work against risk to health or safety arising out of or in connection with the actions of persons 
at work). This information is also exempt from disclosure under Section 38 (1) (a) and (b) of 
the Freedom of Information Act where disclosure would, or would be likely to endanger the 
physical or mental health of any individual, or endanger the safety of any individual.48 
 
As per the legislative requirement the British Museum undertook a “public interest test” in 
considering whether or not to disclose the information requested: 
 
In applying the public interest test to the use of these exemptions in response to these 
requests, the Museum accepts the principle that there is a public interest in transparency and 
accountability through disclosure of information relating to the security of the Museum and 
that this may help to engender public confidence in the Museum’s security operations in 
relation to potential threats of terrorism. However the Museum takes the view that disclosure 
of information concerning details of how its security systems are operated, of the steps it has 
taken to manage current and on-going potential threats of terrorism and steps it has taken to 
protect its collection and its visitors from such threats would be likely to make the Museum 
more vulnerable to such threats, in particular at this time of heightened national security 
threat levels and recent terrorism incidents. Therefore the Museum concludes that the public 
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interest clearly lies in favour of withholding this information in response to this request in all 
the circumstances of this case.49 
 
This public interest test was typical of the responses from the nine museums who refused to 
disclose any information in response to our requests. 
 
The timing of the FOI requests, in mid-2017, was also a factor in the refusal of some museums 
to disclose any information. In addition to the disrupted terrorist operation targeting the 
British Museum as previously mentioned, the overall threat climate in mid-2017 was 
influenced by terrorist attack at Westminster in March of that year, the Manchester Arena 
bombing in May, the London Bridge attack in June, and the Finsbury Park attack also in June. 
Within this period the international terrorism threat level in the UK was raised to “Critical,” 
its highest level, meaning that an attack is expected imminently, for a period of four days 
following the attack in Manchester. During the rest of the period the international terrorism 
threat level was at its second highest level of “Severe,” meaning that an attack is highly likely. 
Our requests for information on counterterrorism security measures at museums were 
considered in the context of this wider threat climate. For example, the Tate, covering a family 
of four galleries—including the Tate Britain, Tate Modern, and Tate Liverpool, which were 
subject to our FOI requests—explicitly referenced recent attacks in its refusal to disclose 
information: 
 
In light of recent world events, including the very recent acts of terrorism in Westminster and 
Manchester, Tate considers that to release any information about its security measures and 
operational matters relating to staff security training would, or would [be] likely to, prejudice 
Tate’s ability to protect its visitors, staff and property from harm.50 
 
Similarly, Glasgow Life, a charity delivering services at museums across the city—including the 
Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum, the Riverside Museum, the Gallery of Modern Art, and 
the People’s Palace, all of which were subject to our FOI requests—responded: 
 
In light of the above, and as the current national threat level of terrorism remains classified 
as “severe” Glasgow Life is of the view that there is a realistic prospect that the release of 
information relating to certain counter-terrorism measures and security arrangements at 
Glasgow Museums, could be utilised in the planning and preparation of a malicious act. Such 
malicious acts would undoubtedly endanger both the physical and mental health of 
individuals within our venues.51 
 
For the Museum of London: 
 
We … believe that releasing this information would be likely to alert potential terrorists to the 
preparedness, or lack thereof, of the Museum of London for dealing with a terrorist attack. 
Given the current UK security threat level rating of Severe, with an attack deemed highly 
likely, we feel that there could be a causal link between a terrorist gaining knowledge of our 




It is notable that these refusals to disclose information on the basis of existing threat were 
also prior to the subsequent attacks in June. 
 
Moreover, in addition to a reluctance to disclose information due to the perception of threat 
and the view that such disclosure would jeopardize the safety of the museum and its staff and 
patrons, some museums indicated that it was the “public” aspect of disclosure that was of 
particular concern. FOI disclosures are routinely made available to both the individual 
requesting the information and the wider public: the former by direct communication, and 
the latter usually by placing this information on the website of the disclosing body via a 
“publication scheme.” While our academic credentials and scholarly intentions were 
recognized, there was a concern amongst some museums over the precedent that may be set 
through any disclosure and publication of information regarded as sensitive. For the Tate, 
 
Whilst we appreciate that you have requested the information in relation to your academic 
work, unfortunately a disclosure under FOIA [the FOI Act] is effectively a disclosure to the 
public at large. If we disclose this information to you, we would have to disclose it to any other 
person who requested it.53 
 
In e-mail correspondence Royal Museums Greenwich indicated a willingness to discuss these 
matters on a one-to-one basis as they were “keen to assist” but had “concerns providing the 
level of detail requested.” Nevertheless, despite the refusals of eleven museums to disclose 
information based on perceptions of threat and the “public” aspect of disclosure, twenty-
seven museums did provide useful information through partial or full disclosure in relation to 
our requests. 
 
The most comprehensive response to the FOI request submitted for our research was 
provided by the National Portrait Gallery, which returned thirty-six separate documents, 
much of which pertained to the routine e-mail correspondence between the museum security 
manager and police counterterrorism officers (although parts of this correspondence were 
redacted to remove some personal information). This e-mail correspondence pertained to a 
variety of issues. On 19 March 2015 a Metropolitan Police CTSA contacted the National 
Portrait Gallery to provide reassurances following the attack at the Bardo Museum in Tunisia 
that took place the previous day. The e-mail, with the subject title “Tunisia,” contained advice 
on Lockdown procedures and Stay Safe guidance, while remarking: “I should reiterate that 
there is no information to suggest that an attack is being planned on museums/galleries or 
cultural sites in the UK.”54 
 
Much of the disclosed correspondence was routine; for example, indicating that 
counterterrorism training and awareness-raising seminars were scheduled, to which 
museums and galleries staff were invited to attend. Other correspondence, however, further 
indicated the way in which the museum was closely integrated into the counterterrorism 
policing network. The museum received an update on the Westminster attack on 23 March 
2017, the day after the attack took place, with advice and guidance on how businesses in the 
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area should respond (the National Portrait Gallery is approximately one mile from where the 
attack took place). This advice was forwarded to all staff in the museum. Similarly, in response 
to a counterterrorism protective security update, the museum security manager contacted 
all staff on 24 May 2017 to inform them of the increase in the threat level to Critical, which 
occurred the previous day. Relevant parts of this e-mail are given below in figure 3, indicating 
the security measures that the museum had planned in response: 
 
Figure 3. National Portrait Gallery e-mail. 
 
It is clear from the comprehensive FOI response from the National Portrait Gallery that the 
museum was receiving both routine contact and rapid protective security advice from the 
police counterterrorism network, which was in turn disseminated via the museum security 
manager to staff across the museum. This communication disclosed the particular nature of 
counterterrorism policy and practice in the National Portrait Gallery. The remainder of 
disclosures from other museums gave further indication of the nature and extent of 
counterterrorism security delivery in the museum environment. 
 
Security Delivery in the Museum Environment 
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The FOI requests to museums asked for information relating to the management structure of 
security at these locations, with a view to understanding the various roles with responsibility 
for designing and delivering security in this space. Any understanding of this task, however, 
must appreciate that museums are not monolithic in their organization or culture. As Patrick 
Boylan has remarked, 
 
The growth in museum employment is not only due to the creation of new museums, but also 
includes the increasing complexity and specialization of museum work internally in relation 
to the traditional curatorial and collections management duties of collection, conservation, 
exhibition, and research. There has been a rapid expansion of the museum’s role into new 
important areas of responsibility, particularly the increasing recognition that museums must 
accept a far wider educational and social role within their society and community.56 
 
Museums, particularly the larger establishments, are thus internally heterogeneous and 
compartmentalized; comprising diverse and distinct departments that are staffed by 
specialists in their respective fields—from finance, administration, and commercial 
operations to human resources, education, and collections—each of which will have their 
own values, tastes, dispositions, and worldviews. 
 
The FOI responses highlighted the ways in which responsibilities for aspects of security in the 
museum are formally distributed across an array of museum staff: from public-facing visitor 
services to the less visible senior management team. Importantly, the responses signposted 
that several museums have a member of staff dedicated solely to leading and delivering 
security, while others, particularly smaller museums, have a nominated member of staff who 
has responsibility for security among an array of other roles and functions. In relation to the 
latter, for example, the Pitt Rivers Museum responded: 
 
The Director of the Museum has ultimate responsibility for security. The Head of Operations, 
who is also the Security Liaison Officer, currently oversees all aspects of security.57 
 
Similarly, for the Museum of Natural History: 
 
The Director of the Museum has ultimate responsibility for security. The Museum’s 
Administrator is the Security Liaison Officer, and she works closely with Oxford University 
Security Service on security plans and emergency action plans.58 
 
Both the Pitt Rivers Museum and the Museum of Natural History are part of the Gardens, 
Libraries and Museums of the University of Oxford, hence the similarity in the FOI responses. 
 
Several museums responded by indicating that they contract the services of a private security 
company. For example, the National Gallery provided an organizational chart that linked their 
own internal head of security to the external company Securitas, who manage some visitor-
facing and security staff services for the museum.59 The FOI response from the Victoria and 
Albert, a charity body with responsibility for several museums—including the Victoria and 
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Albert Museum and the Victoria and Albert Museum of Childhood, both of which were subject 
to our FOI requests— provided an indication of the sometimes complex nature of ensuring 
the delivery of security, encompassing both public and private actors: 
 
The V&A [Victoria and Albert] has a Security Director with oversight of all aspects of protective 
security. He chairs the museum[’s] Safety and Security Committee and reports to the Senior 
Management Team and Board of Trustees as appropriate. The museum has an Internal 
Security Team, a contract security team and ensures that security is embedded in the roles 
and responsibilities of all staff.60 
 
For the Natural History Museum: 
 
The Museum employs a Head of Security and Deputy Head of Security. They oversee all 
aspects of physical security of the Museum and are accountable for the service delivery. Core 
Security services are provided by a Contractor.61 
 
For the smaller Fitzwilliam Museum: 
 
The Museum has a Security Manager and Deputy Security Manager and a team of Security 
Assistants. All Visitor Services and Technician staff also have collections security duties written 
into their job descriptions, and security of the collections is viewed as a shared responsibility 
across all museum staff.62 
 
Interestingly, the Museum of Science and Industry in Manchester provided that their private 
security contractor was “accredited to deliver the Police’s counter terrorism awareness 
training, Project Griffin,” and that this contractor had run various training sessions at this 
museum and other Science Museum sites on a regular basis.63 
 
Irrespective of the structure for delivering security, it was clear that the museums that 
responded to this question via FOI each have a central point of contact within the museum 
with responsibility for security delivery and to act as the conduit for information to flow 
between the museum and the police counterterrorism network. In particular, it was clear that 
this central point of contact, most commonly a dedicated “museum security manager” 
provides the channel through which police CTSAs deliver security advice and staff training and 
awareness to museums and organize site risk assessments. National Museums Liverpool, a 
group with responsibility for several museums—including the Merseyside Maritime Museum, 
the Museum of Liverpool, the World Museum, and the International Slavery Museum, all of 
which were subject to our FOI requests—provided: 
 
Our current structure is a security advisor working within Estates and Collections Directorate, 
acting as a conduit of information from the National Security Advisor and the North West 




It is clear from the disclosed information that typical practice involves the museum security 
manager receiving counterterrorism security advice from the police CTSA, and subsequently 
communicating this security message, including an awareness of threats from terrorism, 
across a unique and differentiated organization within which such concerns may not 
necessarily be at the forefront of museum practitioner or leadership interest. A future 
challenge for museums in the UK will be in creating confident and competent staff both within 
and beyond dedicated “security personnel”—from security officers and visitor support to 
directors, registrars, curators, and conservation experts—who individually and collectively 
recognize the security imperative, but also balance this against the challenges of widening 
participation and encouraging diversity at museums. 
 
Summary and concluding remarks 
In this article we have sought to highlight both the promise and pitfalls of an 
underutilized research method that can be used to address an enduring issue in the study of 
terrorism: the over-reliance on secondary sources.65 Drawing on information collected 
through FOI requests, this article has uncovered the recent development of counterterrorism 
security practices at museums in the UK; locations that jihadist terrorists have recently 
targeted through both propaganda and operational activity. Our research has re-interpreted 
the museum and its meaning within the “single narrative” of global jihadist terrorism, an 
outlook that justifies and legitimizes the targeting of sociocultural sites from instrumental and 
symbolic perspectives. Having established this perspective, we proceeded to explore the 
nature of current counterterrorism security practices at museums. In doing so we signposted 
the ways in which museums interface with the wider UK counterterrorism policing and 
security network; primarily through staff dedicated to this task, most commonly a museum 
security manager. This analysis has demonstrated the value of using FOI as a tool for collecting 
primary data; addressing, at least in part, the paucity of data highlight by Marc Sageman in 
his discussion of the stagnation in terrorism research.66 
 
Moreover, the use of FOI does not only provide data for terrorism research; it also 
acts as a form of public sociology, which, for all its criticisms, seeks to move scholarship 
beyond the ivory tower of academia and toward an engagement in public debate on the 
nature and future of our social worlds.67 As Walby and Luscombe have argued in the context 
of conducting qualitative research in the social sciences, 
 
FOI not only helps researchers better understand the processual and organizational 
dynamics of public bodies, it also allows academics, as active citizens, to help hold those in 
positions of power accountable for their actions.68 
 
The publication of FOI data results in the entry of the requested information into the 
public record, accessible to all, creating opportunity for debate and dialog. Nevertheless, 
there are clear limitations in using such methods to uncover the policies, processes, and 
practices of public institutions, particularly in the contexts of counterterrorism and national 
security.69 In particular, organizations may be reluctant to disclose any such information, and 
subsequently refuse to disclose data based on powerful exemptions in existing legislation or 
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provide only partial responses. Despite such limitations, the use of FOI in this study did result 
in the obtaining of data on museum security and counterterrorism policy and practice that 
were previously unavailable in the public domain to any researcher. It is here, where the use 
of FOI yields new, but limited, data that the active and attuned social researcher can deploy 
additional methodological tools (such as qualitative interviews or surveys) and weave these 
threads together, creating, through the mixing of methods, a richer representation of the 
subject under inquiry. 
 
We conclude that there is now a requirement for further qualitative inquiry into the 
museum as an emerging site of counterterrorism security discourse and practice, particularly 
in relation to how dedicated museum security staff understand and navigate this unique 
cultural space. Our research indicates that museum security managers, about whom very little 
is known, play a significant role in mediating security messaging from police CTSAs for the 
museum environment and implementing security measures in response. Museums have thus 
become a site of securitization, where visitors can now routinely expect to be subject to and 
experience bag searches, hostile vehicle mitigation, and the screening and interpretation of 
“suspicious” visitor behavior.70 In this way, the museum can now be appropriately 
considered as another site in the securitization of “frontline leisure.”71 This represents a 
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